November 99

Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC.

Beleaguered Himalayas: The Crisis in Kashmir

Asad Naqvi is a graduate student in the Department of Physics at MIT. Abha Sur is a visiting scholar in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. Both are active members of the Alliance for a Secular and Democratic South Asia in Cambridge.

Kashmir, an area resplendent in its natural beauty, its multi-religious and multi-ethnic diversity, and its exquisite arts, has been the site of political and social turmoil for the last fifty years. The travesty of colonialism, the expansionist ideologies of nationalism, and a succession of corrupt local governments taken together deny even a modicum of democracy to the Kashmiri people. In this milieu, resistance to the structures of power have taken on different hues, ranging from secular opposition to more virulent forms of religious chauvinism. To understand the current political situation in the area it is necessary to recount briefly its history.

The Kashmir dispute dates back to the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Kashmir was one of 565 semi-autonomous princely states in colonial India. The leaders of these states had the option, at least in principle, to accede to either India or Pakistan or to choose independence. Maharaja Hari Singh, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir with a predominantly Muslim population, delayed accession to either India or Pakistan in the hope of preserving his dictatorial power. However, in late October 1947, panicking at the Muslim revolt in Poonch, the northwestern sector of Jammu, and invasion of the Kashmir valley by several thousand Pathan tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, Hari Singh turned to New Delhi, asking for immediate military support. Accession to India was the condition for New Delhi's support and the Maharaja obliged on October 26th. The military support came promptly and stopped the approaching Pathan invaders. The exact sequence of events in the last couple of weeks of October 1947 is the subject of much controversy but that does not concern us here.

The Pakistan army regulars joined the Pathan tribesmen in early 1948, and by January 1949, the UN had brokered a cease-fire, which ended the first Indo-Pak war. The cease-fire line left India in control of two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir, which included almost the entire Valley, most of Ladakh and most of Jammu. Pakistan controlled the remaining one-third, consisting of western Jammu and Poonch, and Baltistan and Gilgit.

At that time, both Louis Mountbatten, the British governor general of India, and the Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, regarded the accession conditional upon a plebiscite to determine whether Kashmir should belong to India or Pakistan. It is important to note that the UN resolution ratified by both India and Pakistan had conveniently dropped the option of an independent Kashmir. In any case, the plebiscite has never been held.

Sheikh Abdullah, the dynamic and popular leader of the National Conference (NC), which had organized resistance against the Maharaja's rule in Kashmir in the 1930s and 40s, was given charge of governance of Kashmir after the accession. The NC had supported the accession and was an ally of the Indian government. The terms of accession, as embodied in article 370 of the Indian constitution, granted autonomy for Kashmir with the provision that defense, foreign affairs, and communications would be controlled by the central government. In the state elections held in 1951, the NC won every single seat. The autonomy of Kashmir did not sit well with some Hindu nationalists. Thus in 1952-53, amidst sporadic revolts by the Hindu nationalists in the Jammu area, Abdullah put forward the possibility of independence for Kashmir. The move made him unpopular with the government in New Delhi and he was subsequently arrested and replaced by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, himself an important member of the NC. The Bakshi government, the first in the ensuing cycle of powerless governments controlled from New Delhi, was corrupt and repressive. The special autonomous status of Kashmir, too, was gradually abrogated: For example in 1954, a constitutional order gave the New Delhi government jurisdiction to legislate on all Jammu and Kashmir matters. In 1964-65, articles 356 and 357 allowed the government at the center to dismiss provincial governments in Jammu and Kashmir. By mid 1960s, for all practical purposes, there was no trace of autonomy left in Kashmir.

Pakistan, wanting to take advantage of the widespread discontent in the area in the summer of 1965, sent thousands of armed Pakistani soldiers to infiltrate the Valley of Kashmir in order to create a general rebellion. The action found little support among the Kashmiri people and prompted India to attack Pakistan across the international border, resulting in an all-out India-Pakistan war. The war lasted for about two weeks after which a cease-fire was negotiated. Again in 1971, India and Pakistan went to war over the issue of East Pakistan. At the end of the war, which was detrimental for Pakistan and led to the creation of Bangladesh, Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto negotiated the Simla agreement. This bilateral agreement called for the creation of a line of control based on the position of the two armies at the time of the cease-fire of 17 December 1971. At the behest of New Delhi, the agreement de-emphasized the role of the UN in Kashmir and stressed bi-lateral negotiations for the resolution of all disputes between India and Pakistan.

After Sheikh Abdullah's death in 1982, his son, Farooq Abdullah took charge of the NC and won state elections in 1983. Farooq Abdullah's relations with the Congress government in New Delhi were marked by opportunism and power plays on both sides. Farooq's alliance with the Congress in 1986 was seen by many Kashmiris as a betrayal, and a number of political groups in the Valley spontaneously formed a coalition called Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF was comprised of a broad spectrum of political and social groups: it had educated urban youth, working class, and farmers, all frustrated with corruption, nepotism, and lack of economic development. In the 1987 elections, which the MUF contested, it lost to the NC-Congress alliance because of blatant rigging. The rigging of the election led to peaceful demonstrations that were suppressed by Farooq Abdullah, the newly-elected chief minister, through repression and intimidation. Mass arrests and torture of MUF activists followed. The resistance to the systematic stifling of popular political opposition led to the formation of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a militant group calling for the independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. In July 1988, JKLF carried out its first bombing in Srinagar, signaling the start of the insurgency. In November 1989, Indian parliamentary elections were held in Kashmir. JKLF and other opposition groups boycotted the elections, which had a voter turnout of less than 5 percent. By January 1990, Indian paramilitary troops and the militants clashed on a daily basis. The state assembly was dissolved and Kashmir was placed under central rule.

The Indian government's suppression of the rebellion was marked with gross human rights abuses, including shooting of peaceful demonstrators, massacre of civilians, summary execution of detainees, rape, including incidents of mass and gang rape, attacks against journalists, large-scale arson and razing of civilian homes, properties, and public institutions in major towns, andcordon-and-search operations, which involved beatings and intimidation. These became a standard norm of punishment to a "disloyal" population. The militants were also guilty of abuses against the Kashmiri people, with frequent brutal attacks against the Hindus, government officials, civil servants, and suspected informers. This led to the flight, with the Indian government's encouragement and assistance, of some 100,000 Kashmiri Hindus from the area.

By the time of the 1996 elections in Kashmir, the Indian government had, according to its own estimates, succeeded in curbing the militancy in the area. JKLF, which was the leading resistance group in the early 1990s, had declared a cease-fire in 1994. Although there were reports of people being forced to cast their ballots, the voter turnout was still low and Farooq Abdullah came to power once again.

Today the major militant organizations active in Kashmir are Hizb-ul-Mujahidin, Harakat-ul Ansar, and Lashkar-i Tayyaba. The latter two especially are comprised of a large number of non-Kashmiris (fighters predominantly from Afghanistan who have infiltrated through Pakistan) and all three adhere to Islamic right-wing ideology. These groups favor accession to Pakistan, obtain direct military support from Pakistan, and enjoy little popularity among the Kashmiri people. In 1999, in an operation carried out by the Pakistani army, these militants, with regulars from the Pakistani army, crossed the line of control and took over some key peaks in the Kargil region. The Indian army retaliated with air strikes and ground counter attacks. The situation was only brought under control when, under international pressure, the Pakistani government withdrew the militants unilaterally. This led to a rift between the government and the armed forces in Pakistan and contributed in a significant manner to the recent military takeover in Pakistan.

Regardless of its antecedents, the reality of Kashmir today is tortured and complex. Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani government has shown any regard for the aspirations and well-being of the Kashmiri people, and both have used the Kashmir issue to whip up jingoistic patriotism in their respective countries. The religious right wing in each country has used the situation to further promote its agenda of intolerance and bigotry. With both countries having tested their nuclear bombs and poised to deploy weapons, the stakes in the region have become extraordinarily high. The Kashmiri people, brutalized on the one hand by the repression of the Indian government and on the other by the terrorist tactics of the more extreme separatist groups, with active support from Pakistan, have had no democratic space in which to assert their rights. For any long-term solution to the Kashmir problem, it is imperative that democratic structures be fully restored in Kashmir. This entails demilitarizing the region and instilling confidence in the people of Kashmir that they can exercise their vote meaningfully. The peace movements in the two countries have to campaign vigorously for the right of self-determination, including the right of independence of the people of Kashmir.

Why an Interim Civilian Pakistani Government will Fail

State power in Pakistan has always been distributed so that key goals have been set and prioritized by the military, and civilian governments have had the job of implementing them. This unnatural separation between goal making and execution makes for a system that has crashed frequently in the past, and is destined to keep crashing in the future. The military has sometimes been invisible, and at other times visible, but has been ever-present as the hand behind the system. At this critical juncture of Pakistan's history it needs to accept responsibility for having contributed to the country's present political and economic situation, and be permitted to lead it out of the morass....

Setting up a caretaker government will be a fruitless endeavour doomed to fail. Selected by the military from a fractious lot of political aspirants with generally dubious credentials and no credible program of action, it will have no mandate or authority to address issues of real national significance. In 1967, Field Marshal Ayub Khan wrote disparagingly of the Combined Opposition Parties as being like 'nine cats with their tails tied together....'

...for all past civilian governments, three critical areas have remained wholly or largely closed to intervention, and even inspection. These are, in order of increasing opacity, the economy, foreign policy, and nuclear and defense affairs. Whether in Delhi, Geneva, or Washington, no civilian Pakistan government can engage in meaningful negotiations whether on the CTBT, fissile materials cutoff treaty, limits to weaponization or deployment, etc. It is neither empowered to take significant decisions by itself without consultation and clearance from the 'higher' authority, nor even adequately knowledgeable....

For 52 years nothing has occupied our energy, time, resources and emotions more than relations with India....Any accommodation on Kashmir with India, though far from a final resolution, must be negotiated directly with the Pakistan military and not a civilian government. No civilian government can dare close down the offices or training camps of any mujahideen group. On the other hand, the mujahideen withdrawal from Kargil at the orders of the military has conclusively established the extent of control that the military exercises upon them. Negotiating with the military is likely to be tough because it is committed to the liberation of Kashmir as its highest priority goal....

Pakistan's current budget is split between debt servicing and defence, with barely 20% left for all else. This becomes an argument for directly dealing with the military on an issue of the greatest importance, on which civilian governments are unable to deal effectively....The Nawaz and Bhutto governments failed in collecting taxes rightfully due to the state, retained and strengthened feudalism and tribalism, and led the country to its present economic predicament. Only the army has the power to voluntarily decrease its own expenditures and the strength to confront tax-evaders and loan defaulters. The question is: Will it?

For better or for worse, the military has broken an 11-year-old taboo against directly intervening in national politics by dismissing a corrupt and dictatorial, but democratically elected leader. As yet no restrictions on civil liberties have been imposed, nor have the dreaded military courts been imposed. There is no justification for these. But now, instead of resorting to back-seat driving once again, the Pakistan military must take full responsibility in steering Pakistan out of its present state of crisis, a crisis for which it also bears much responsibility. Putting up a front government will achieve simply nothing.

Pervez Hoodbhoy

The Coup in Pakistan and The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

GORDON S. CLARK (executive director of the grassroots American organization Peace Action Action): "The military coup in Pakistan dramatically underscores the need for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Will we be more secure or less secure with countries like Pakistan developing nuclear weapons? Because that is exactly what is going to happen if the US rejects this treaty, and this treaty is only the beginning for the Republicans. George W. Bush, among others, has already said he favors abandoning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would without question cause Russia to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons. Is this what America needs--an unbridled global nuclear arms race?"

JACQUELINE CABASSO (specialist in nuclear disarmament, executive director of the Western States Legal Foundation, member of the Coordinating Committee of the US Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons): "The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was supposed to be a disarmament treaty. It was supposed to cut off the modernization and development of nuclear weapons and lead to their deterioration and eventual elimination. That's why people everywhere have worked tirelessly since the `Ban the Bomb' days in the 1950s to end nuclear testing. That's why most of the world's countries have made the CTBT their top disarmament priority in international negotiating fora. And that's why the vast majority of Americans support the CTBT today. Yet the current Senate debate has made clear that the Clinton administration's intent is to `ban the bang, not the bomb' and that the US plans to maintain and modernize its nuclear arsenal indefinitely."

JAY TRUMAN (director of the Downwinders Organization, who grew up in Southern Utah, watching mushroom clouds rise from the Nevada Test Site about 110 miles to the west): "Yesterday's sudden military coup in Pakistan can only make a dangerous situation worse and dramatically raises the risks of a nuclear confrontation. One clear option open to Pakistan's new military government to solidify support will be to quickly engage in additional nuclear testing as a show of power over rival India. Should that occur, India will likely conduct yet another round of nuclear testing to one-up Pakistan.... The failure of the US to take the lead in securing a truly comprehensive test ban and other measures starting on the path to nuclear disarmament clearly shares a major part of the blame for the recent nuclear arms race."

For more information, Institute for Public Accuracy, 915 National Press Building, Washington DC 20045 (202) 347-00200 Beleaguered Himalayas: The Crisis in Kashmir