April 2005

Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC.

Will Southern Sudan's Peace Help the Forgotten War in Northern Uganda?

Jeffrey Mapendere is Senior Program Associate to the Conflict Resolution Program of The Carter Center. A national of Zimbabwe, he is a former liberation fighter and army officer who has extensive practice as a conflict resolution professional. He has spent many months in northern Uganda as part of the Center's work there. Tom Crick is the Senior Political Analyst and Assistant Director of the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center. www.cartercenter.org.

LRA soldiers in Gulu pose after meeting with the Carter Center, March, 2003. Ages from left to right: 13, 21, and 16 years old. Photo: Jeffrey Mapendere

The historic agreement to end almost 50 years of civil war in southern Sudan, signed this January, brings not only the promise of peace to Sudan, but also to the region. In particular, many observers hope that stability in southern Sudan will help end the 19-year conflict in northern Uganda. UNHCR head Jan Egland last year called northern Uganda the world's "largest neglected humanitarian emergency."

Because of the Sudanese agreement, it is argued, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) will no longer have access to bases in Sudan, and so must either sue for peace or face inevitable military defeat. The reality may prove less straightforward, however. Finding peace in northern Uganda is complex and elusive and may continue to be so.

History

After independence in 1962, Uganda was relatively peaceful until 1966 when the country's first Prime Minister, Milton Obote, ordered General Idi Amin to storm the Baganda King's palace and depose his court. Amin murdered thousands of the King's followers. Since then, no Ugandan leader has come to power through peaceful means. Amin's own reign of terror began when he overthrew Obote in 1971, and lasted until the Tanzanian Army intervened in 1979 and installed Professor Yusuf Lule as President. Obote became President again in 1980 following an allegedly unfair election and, as a result, the current President, Yoweri Museveni, launched a guerilla war to overthrow Obote. General Tito Okelo, an Acholi from northern Uganda, removed Obote in 1985 and was in turn overthrown by Museveni a year later. This turbulent period, combined with insecurity in neighboring countries, spawned numerous rebel groups, some of whom continue to trouble Museveni's government even today. The LRA has proved the most bloody and enduring legacy of those violent times.

The Lord's Resistance Army

The overthrow of Okelo's government was by no means a clean affair. When Museveni's predominantly southern and western troops reached Acholiland -- the region that historically provided the troops for Uganda's army -- they committed atrocities against the Acholi people as punishment for their military support to previous regimes. Some remnant of Okelo's predominantly Acholi forces fled to southern Sudan from where they began a guerilla war against the Museveni government. Before long, the charismatic spiritualist Alice Lakwena emerged to lead this force, and other Acholi, under a new Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). The fearless HSM fighters had initial military success in the north and even pushed deep into central Uganda until eventually they were crushed by the Ugandan army in late 1987. Lakwena fled to Kenya, where she remains today.

Despite this defeat, the surviving fighters regrouped under the leadership of Joseph Kony, a cousin of Lakwena's, who renamed the movement the Lord's Resistance Army. Both cousins were raised as Christians in rural villages. Both believe their struggle is guided by the Lord in order to liberate their people from Museveni's government, and believe in traditional spiritual powers, including invincibility. Both are considered prophets by their followers.

Unlike traditional guerrilla movements, the LRA has survived until today despite having no clear political agenda besides removing Museveni and a desire to rule the country by the Ten Commandments. Another unusual characteristic is that guerilla movements typically claim to fight for their own populations, whereas the LRA's own people, the Acholi, have suffered the most at their hands. Lacking a clear political vision, their only means of recruitment is to abduct Acholi children. Thousands of these children have been taken to camps in Sudan for military training or to be enslaved as "wives" to LRA commanders. The child soldiers have been forced to return to Uganda to abduct other children, and ordered to committ atrocities, even against their own families. The main victims of Kony's war, therefore, are the children from his own people.

Given the relatively small size of the LRA (estimates range from 2,000 to 5,000), and the harm that they have done to their own people, many question how the LRA has survived for so long. Part of the answer lies in the ill-equipped and often ill-disciplined Ugandan army. For years, these forces have failed to defeat the LRA and have struggled to provide protection to displaced person's camps. Kony, by contrast, has proved to be an evasive and effective guerilla tactician. The LRA fight in small groups, are adept at capturing and storing supplies, and move their bases quickly. They are intimately familiar with the terrain. They strike fast, brutalize villagers, kidnap children, then withdraw into the night.

Also, at times the LRA has received support from the Sudanese, who used the LRA both to punish the Ugandan government for its support for the Sudanese rebel movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and to fight the SPLA within Sudan. The instability in southern Sudan has meant that the LRA could retreat to bases across the border, even at times when the Sudan government has been less welcoming.

There is a surprising ambivalence among the Acholi community toward Kony, given the brutality he has inflicted upon them. The LRA attacks against the Acholi and their children inspire nothing but fear. However, since the LRA fights against Museveni and represents the military pride of the north against the central government, some Acholi can be sympathetic. Kony has always claimed that Acholi traditional leaders blessed his rebellion before he left for the bush and has showed great respect for them. Also, the people of northern Uganda are resentful that the central government has not provided them with more security and consistently do not support Museveni at elections.

Effects of the War

For 19 years, the world has shown little interest in the conflict, and neither has the war seriously threatened Museveni's political power. It has, however, had a devastating effect on the Acholi and neighboring Langi peoples. Approximately 13,000 children have been abducted, a million people have been displaced, and thousands have been killed. Internally displaced people are largely dependent on under-funded international aid programs, which are easily disrupted by LRA attacks. Schools have been destroyed by the war. Most are deserted. In recent years, children commute each day to sleep on the streets in towns, rather than risk attack at night in their rural homes. The economy is in ruins, and rich farming land goes untended due to insecurity. The war has been extremely traumatizing, and several non-governmental organizations and church groups work hard to provide psychosocial treatment for the displaced and former child rebels.

Yet the provision of aid will not end the fighting or address its root causes. Local advocates, such as traditional and religious leaders, have developed a strong voice for peace, but their influence is limited. International attention to the problem has been minimal, and is often short-term. In 1999, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter brokered an agreement between Sudan and Uganda in which each side agreed to stop supporting rebel groups in each other's country. Shortly after, President Museveni signed an amnesty bill for all LRA fighters, reflecting a national desire to end the conflict peacefully. Most Acholi accept that atrocities committed by child soldiers were involuntary and would welcome back their children from the bush. However, not all Acholi are so forgiving, and some former abductees who have escaped from the LRA and accepted the amnesty are ostracized.

Despite the amnesty, President Museveni's personal inclination is to defeat Kony militarily. The tension between the desire to end the war quickly through amnesty, and the need to hold the LRA responsible for their terrible crimes, has long been debated in the north. These tensions are sometimes settled locally by traditional ceremonies of reconciliation and reparation. Recently, the International Criminal Court has elevated this question to the international stage with the launch of an investigation into crimes committed in northern Uganda by the LRA.

Peace Efforts

Historically, there have been numerous unsuccessful efforts at peace talks by individuals and local and international groups. Best known, perhaps, was the effort in 1994 of Betty Bigombe, who was then a Ugandan cabinet minister. Bigombe's effort was close to success when President Museveni abruptly ended the ceasefire, fearing that the rebels were not acting swiftly enough or in good faith. Since then, extreme mutual mistrust has undermined attempts to foster meaningful talks. Acholi traditional and religious leaders have worked hard to open channels to talk with the LRA, but these efforts seldom have the explicit backing of the government and have suffered from fragmentation and competition. External efforts, like those of the Rome-based Community of St. Egideo and The Carter Center, have been equally unsuccessful. The Carter effort lead to restored diplomatic relations between Sudan and Uganda, but was unable to build the needed trust for talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government, despite two meetings with Kony. Last year, Bigombe returned to Uganda as a private citizen and used her relationships to convince both the Ugandan government and the LRA leadership to observe two separate ceasefires to allow for talks and the departure of four of Kony's top commanders. This continuing effort is the most promising in a decade, yet faces familiar obstacles.

The LRA is divided between hardliners, including Kony, who do not trust that the promise of amnesty will be kept, and moderates who are more willing to take this chance and who are desperate to end what has become a futile war. Some have argued that the government's approach to the LRA -- talking and fighting simultaneously -- makes peace talks much harder. In addition, there are many people who profit from the war, and have no interest in encouraging peace. More recently, many Acholi believe that the ICC's investigation into the LRA is making it harder to persuade LRA leaders that it would be safe to leave the bush under any circumstances.

Some claim that the LRA's days are now numbered, given the changes in Sudan and recent military setbacks. However, the military approach has not been successful for 19 years. Prognosticators have predicted for years that the LRA is on the verge of defeat. Kony has, however, consistently survived and regrouped his forces. Even if it were possible to remove Kony by force, this would not guarantee peace in the north. While the Acholi have strong feelings against the LRA, they also have strong feelings against the government and, without addressing both of these problems, the north would likely remain a fertile area for violence. Each opportunity for peace should, therefore, be given the greatest chance to succeed.

[Editor's Note: To help with humanitarian assistance to refugees, Doctors Without Borders has a large operation in Uganda, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/uganda.shtml, 333 7th Avenue, 2nd Floor, New York, NY, 10001.]

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