December/January 2004-2005

Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC.

Days of Infamy

John Lamperti lives in Vermont and is active with the American Friends Service Committee in New England.

Three US navy ships bombed at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Library of Congress photo.

On December 7, 1941 Japanese forces attacked United States naval and air bases in the Hawaiian Islands, and scored a major military victory. Over 2300 US military personnel lost their lives --- almost half of them crew of the battleship Arizona which was blown up and sunk in the harbor by bombs and torpedoes -- and the US Pacific fleet was devastated. The next day President Franklin Roosevelt called for a declaration of war, and described the day of the Japanese attack as "a date which will live in infamy."

Just why was the Pearl Harbor raid "infamous"? The Japanese planes attacked strictly military targets and there were relatively few civilian casualties. The battle was a terrible defeat for the American armed forces, which were taken completely by surprise. But a surprise attack is not infamous in wartime; every military commander would attack by surprise if possible. Nor did the bitter facts of US defeat and heavy losses make the raid criminal under international law. There is just one reason the operation was infamous: because it was an act of military aggression. Japan and the United States were not then at war, although hostilities were threatening. Legally, Pearl Harbor was a crime because the Japanese struck first.

Sixty years later, the administration of President George W. Bush has made "preemption" a part of US national policy. The Bush National Security Strategy of 2002 states that "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -- and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

That is just what Japan did in 1941. There is no question that the United States posed a huge threat to what Japanese leaders considered to be vital national interests. Japanese military planners, who by then were in control of their country's government, saw armed conflict with the United States as inevitable. Despite some doubts, the top leaders decided that since war was coming, a high-risk, high-gain surprise attack, intended to disable US naval power in the Pacific, would give Japan the best chance to achieve its goals. In other words, they chose preemption.

The United States did not accept the legitimacy of Japanese or German claims of "preemption" after the end of the war. In August 1945, US Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson wrote: "We must make it clear to the Germans that the wrong for which their fallen leaders are on trial is not that they lost the war, but that they started it. ... our position is that no grievances or policies will justify resort to aggressive war. It is utterly renounced and condemned as an instrument of policy." During the next few years, officials and military officers of both Germany and Japan were tried and convicted for planning and carrying out aggression committed by their countries' armed forces. There was no exception for "preemptive war," although some of the accused tried to use that concept as part of their defense.

For President Bush and his administration allies, if they would be consistent, there was nothing wrong in what the Japanese did on December 7, 1941. For the rest of us, that attack on Pearl Harbor remains a "day of infamy." Preemptive war was not a legitimate policy for the Japanese in 1941, and it is not legitimate today. The United States must again "renounce and condemn" preemptive war as part of its policy and planning.

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