| November 2003
American Friends Service Committee Peacework Magazine Sara Burke, Managing Editor Sam Diener, Editor Pat Farren, Founding Editor 2161 Massachusetts Ave. Telephone number: Fax number:
pwork@igc.org Peacework has been published monthly since 1972, intended to serve as a source of dependable information to those who strive for peace and justice and are committed to furthering the nonviolent social change necessary to achieve them. Rooted in Quaker values and informed by AFSC experience and initiatives, Peacework offers a forum for organizers, fostering coalition-building and teaching the methods and strategies that work in the global and local community. Peacework seeks to serve as an incubator for social transformation, introducing a younger generation to a deeper analysis of problems and issues, reminding and re-inspiring long-term activists, encouraging the generations to listen to each other, and creating space for the voices of the disenfranchised. Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC. |
Palestinian Extremists Vote Twice for Sharon For this article, published on 2/15/03 by syndicated columnist Tawfiq Abu Baker in several Arab daily newspapers, the author was one of the 2003 winners of the Eliav-Sartawi Awards for Middle Eastern Journalism. These awards celebrate journalism that contributes to better understanding between people in the Middle East. This version is slightly abridged. All of the award-winning articles, as well as the acceptance speeches of the authors, are posted by the Common Ground News Service at www.sfcg.org. Our newspapers are replete with talk about the "dominance of the right" in Israel, and about the Israeli citizen turning toward extremist political parties, as was evident in the last elections, without looking for the reason behind all this. This is the same Israeli public that gave the Labor Party a landslide majority in the 1992 elections, after "the Party" was in opposition - or in the "political shadows" - for 15 years (1977-1992), giving it the authority to follow the path of peace. It is the same public that brought the leader of the Labor Party to power in 1999; the same public that gave the Labor Party 26 seats in the 1999 elections, reduced the Likud, for the first time, to 19 seats, and gave the leftist Meretz party 10 seats. The unusual rise of the Shas movement and the rise of the "Israel Ba'lia - Russian Immigrants" party disrupted, at that time, the power of the Labor Party to control the Knesset balances and both parties, which suffered a crash in these elections, gained momentum at that time for reasons that have nothing to do with politics or war and peace programs. What made the picture change? What made this public vote for Sharon in the direct cabinet elections at the beginning of 2001, and then vote again, with greater force, in these elections in favor of the Likud party, doubling its seats, even though Sharon's term in power witnessed the largest number of casualties and a strong economic recession? Why did this happen? Have they suddenly been struck mad? This is a question that many people avoid facing. This happened, in 2001 and in 2003, as a result of the policies followed by Palestinian extremists, whom moderates in the Authority leadership were reluctant to stop at the right time. Our political cohesion, which protected us for decades, fell apart in the Liberation Organization as a result of extremist incantation. Had we declared a truce for only six weeks, prior to the 2001 cabinet elections, Sharon would not have assumed power at all. This proposal was put forward at the time, but the irresolute were reluctant to capture that historic moment. Palestinian extremists, with Hamas at the forefront, escalated their operations to prevent Barak from returning to power, because his return would probably have resulted in a political settlement with mutual compromises, which they are totally opposed to. Extremists are subjective collaborators, and what they did to push Israeli society to extremism falls in line with their destructive and fantastic program. But this is their own business, and the question that deserves a ruthless review is: Why did the Palestinian Authority leadership permit them to do this, reducing by the day the chances of putting an end to their actions? My opinion has been, and still is, that the quiet that started on December 17, 2001 - the day following the Clinton Initiative - is what should have prevailed, side by side with a non-reluctant, decisive proclamation to accept the initiative. Ironically, we are now panting after a "Road Map" that has much less to offer. History is a series of opportunities and risks, and when its train leaves the station where you are waiting, you should not hesitate to board it. What comes next is another story. Reluctance in decisive moments in history is fatal. Quietly accepting the Clinton Initiative, well before the February 2001 elections, could have stopped Sharon from coming to power, and could have halted the overwhelming rightward trend in the Israeli street. Had the Taba negotiations taken place days after the launching of the Initiative, Palestinian history would have taken a turn. This is a fact that many wish to avoid. After Sharon assumed power, illusions prospered without limits. My head hurt as I listened to them. An example of such illusions is that Sharon is capable of achieving peace, just like Menachem Begin did with Egypt, forgetting that Likud is always ready to forge a peace with the Arabs only to have its way in the land of Palestine, which is exactly what happened as the largest settlement campaign was launched - devouring our country before our own eyes - after the first Camp David Agreement. Another example of an illusion was that the world would stand against Sharon, the man behind all the massacres. The world would then see the true face of the Israeli government, without the cosmetic make-up of the Labor Party. The exact opposite has taken place, and the relations between Israel and the US administration have never been better than during Sharon's reign. The basic reason behind this, and we ignore "causality" in our analysis, is the bombing operations in Israeli streets, cafes, restaurants, and dance clubs. Who can explain to me why an operation takes place during each of the six visits that Sharon paid to the White House, or when he is in Washington, getting ready to meet President Bush? How could the American President put any pressure on him when he sees the pictures of civilians blown to pieces on the streets of Israeli cities, especially after 9/11, when every killer of a civilian was turned into another Osama bin Laden? Among the illusions as well, was that Sharon would be brought down by Israelis when their death toll reached 400. I heard this from many extremists who know nothing about Israel. Firm facts on the ground have proved that the more Israeli "in-house" deaths there are, the more Israelis cling to Sharon as the "savior" in the absence of better political alternatives. Had these casualties been soldiers or settlers in the streets of the West Bank, the picture would have been totally different. Although I am against "militarization" in principle, talk about a Palestinian military option in the absence of the Arab military option is a recipe for suicide and self-destruction, as we saw with our own eyes. Among the illusions, as well, is that Sharon should be lured into the Palestinian cities in the hope that he will commit a massacre that prompts an international intervention. Or perhaps he loses hundreds of soldiers and his nation revolts against him, or perhaps all this leads to a regional deterioration that puts the area in a muddle. None of these scenarios materialized, because all three of them are basically built on wishful thinking and self-deception for which our people paid dearly. The Israelis gave their confidence three times to leftist and middle-left forces, in the hope that they would achieve peace. The worst confrontations took place during the terms of this left and middle-left, prompted by extremist Palestinians with fantastic programs that the Israeli right is comfortable with. Israelis remember that, during Benyamin Netanyahu's term, the fewest confrontations took place, with the lowest number of Israeli casualties. They also remember that the opposite took place during the term of Peres, on the eve of the 1996 elections, with bus bombings in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Ashkelon. The Palestinian leadership knows all too well which regional forces instigated that violence to prevent Shimon Peres from retaining power at the time. Had Peres succeeded then (and he failed by half a point), he might have reached an agreement with the Palestinians before the end of the interim period in May of 1999, and the Consultative Council might have declared the Palestinian State then. This issue terrifies those who oppose a solution that leads to recognizing the State of Israel. All this is understandable. What is incomprehensible, to me at least, is why did the Palestinian leadership allow all these terrifying developments, which oppose its policy? My question is still hanging: Why did we not sign a shadow agreement with the Labor Party, the Meretz Party and leftist and peace-loving personalities in Israel, and declare absolute calm, weeks (and not a few days) prior to the recent elections on January 28? Had we done that, perhaps some parts of the political and partisan map might have changed in Israel. Is it too late? Have we entered yet another tunnel? I do not know, and I do not wish to know. |
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