February 2003

Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC.

Time To Deal with North Korea

James Reilly is AFSC's Quaker International Affairs Representative for East Asia.

Is North Korea really planning to build nuclear weapons? In recent weeks, North Korea (Democratic Republic of Korea, DPRK) has admitted to a covert uranium enrichment program, lifted the freeze on its nuclear facilities in Youngbyun, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and hinted that it might resume missile testing.

North Korean school kids on the way to help with the rice harvest. Photo: Randy Ireson

The question is why? Even as we back away from the edge of the precipice, understanding Pyongyang's motivations holds the key to transforming the chronic instability on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea has sought a viable nuclear deterrent ever since it faced multiple US nuclear threats and near-launches during and after the Korean War. Kim Il Song managed to convince the Soviets to build him a nuclear plant, although they delayed completion while pushing Pyongyang to sign the NPT. In the 1980s Pyongyang began to suggest it was willing to trade its nuclear potential for improved relations with its neighbors, particularly with the United States.

In 1993 Pyongyang went to the brink in its nuclear blackmail before former President Jimmy Carter's visit sparked the bargaining that resulted in the Agreed Framework. This deal traded two light-water reactors (resistant to creating weapons-grade plutonium), an interim supply of heavy oil fuel, a relaxation of US sanctions, and improvement of relations in exchange for North Korea freezing and eventually dismantling its nuclear program.

Yet the Clinton administration, humiliated by its initial mishandling of the crisis, never carried through on the deal. Convinced that the North was facing imminent collapse and unwilling to do the heavy lifting in Congress necessary to build support, the administration hemmed and hawed on all elements of the deal.

Fuel deliveries were chronically late, reactor construction fell far behind schedule, most sanctions were retained, and diplomatic improvements stalled. North Korea responded in typical fashion, provoking a crisis with its 1998 missile launch over Japan. The resultant "Perry process" almost cinched a deal on North Korean missile exports and development, only to fall through for lack of time and political will.

The new Bush administration put the North on hold for almost a year, emerging from isolation with its rhetorical guns blazing. As it was inducted into the "axis of evil," Pyongyang began to realize that the Bush administration was unlikely to follow through on the Agreed Framework. Thus it provoked the latest crisis to try to reach yet another deal with the US.

Reframing the Agreed Framework

US conservatives have repeatedly attacked the Agreed Framework as having gone too far in "rewarding" Pyongyang. In fact, the major flaw with the Agreed Framework was that it did not go far enough. Aimed narrowly at the North's nuclear program, the agreement made only limited inroads into the North's external relations and internal reforms. Lacking aggressive administrative support, the agreement was constantly impeded in Congress and assailed in the press.

Three straight US presidents have decided that the US cannot afford to live with a North Korea with nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework, despite its numerous failings, prevented this from happening. Watching the agreement collapse in recent weeks gives rise to an even greater fear; that it will not be replaced.

The initial response of the Bush administration to the crisis, consistent with its policy of "malign neglect," suggests that some US officials are confident that DPRK proliferation can be dealt with via hostile interception of transfers, its missiles negated by missile defenses, and that the regime can be isolated until it collapses. This is very dangerous thinking.

The North Korean government shows no sign of collapse. If it develops a proven nuclear weapon capacity, Japan and South Korea will likely follow suit, pressuring China to rapidly build up its own nuclear arsenal. Missile defenses will further spur this buildup, sparking an offense-defense race to the bottom. All sides will build more weapons and feel less secure.

What does North Korea Want?

If North Korea really wanted to build a nuclear weapon, why unilaterally halt missile tests in 1998 and repeatedly extend the freeze? Why not re-start the Yongbyon nuclear reactor anytime between 1991 and today? Why admit to the US in October that it indeed had a uranium enrichment program?

Nuclear arms promise no future for this planet U. G. Sato, Silkscreen, 1984, Tokyo, Japan. Center for Political Graphics

The answer is simple: these items are most valuable as bargaining chips. If no deal emerges, the fallback option of a viable nuclear deterrent and missile exports offer Pyongyang enhanced national security, diplomatic leverage vis-a-vis the US and exports to earn hard currency. Yet these come at the price of international condemnation and isolation, as the recent standoff has made abundantly clear.

The nuclear program is not necessary for the DPRK's national security. As the painful policy reversal of the Bush administration has made clear, the North's artillery's capacity to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" provides a sufficient deterrent to unilateral US military action. The nuclear program can thus be put on the table, but only as it is exchanged for irreversible economic and diplomatic benefits.

What North Korea really seeks is an end to the Korean War, access to economic assistance, energy security, and assurances that the US will not attack it. The US should provide all of this, and more, in return for a verifiable freeze on the North's nuclear and missile programs. If North Korea really is selling its nuclear program, the US should be buying.

Let's Make a Deal: Elements of a Bargain with North Korea

Any sustainable solution requires two elements: one, a full-scale engagement policy and two, a renewed commitment to non-proliferation regimes in Northeast Asia. The logic of engagement propelled China's accession to the World Trade Organization through a once-hostile US Congress. The same logic holds true for North Korea.

As the DPRK becomes ensnared in a web of international accords, the costs of withdrawal and the benefits of participation will steadily grow. The government becomes dependent upon economic assistance, access to foreign markets, and security accords that all require adherence to international standards of behavior. Acceptance of international norms filters through the bureaucracy. Domestic support becomes contingent upon economic benefits. Eventually, the reforms become irreversible.

The US should energetically promote this process. It should open wide the doors to international financial institutions, while demanding access and accountability for these funds. Development assistance should be dramatically expanded, particularly through small-scale projects in cooperation with international NGOs.

Energy security can be improved through the iterative process of rebuilding the North's electricity grid, installing energy-efficient end use equipment, and refurbishing existing plants. Security agreements and replacement of the Korean War armistice with a peace treaty should be combined with a series of military confidence-building measures including China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. These steps would reject the North's desire for a formal handshake with the US in favor of an all-encompassing embrace, a bear hug.

At the same time, the Bush administration should renew the US commitment to multilateral arms agreements in Northeast Asia. The Korean peninsula has remained free of nuclear weapons thanks to agreements between the South and North, honored by the first Bush administration by removing all US nuclear forces from Korea. This agreement should be reaffirmed by all major powers in the region, and augmented by a nuclear weapons-free zone encompassing Japan.

As North-South ties steadily improve and the North continues military moderation, diplomatic engagement and economic reform, the US can steadily withdraw its forces from South Korea without sparking a Japanese or South Korean buildup in response.

Such a far-reaching policy must be energetically supported by the Bush administration at home. A half-hearted policy reversal aimed at protecting the administration's right flank would be doomed to the same failings as the Agreed Framework. To avoid returning to the same crisis in few years, it is time for a change in how we deal with North Korea.

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