February 2003

Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC.

Venezuela: Strike Threatens Destabilization

Julia Dietz is the program assistant at the Religious Task Force on Central America and Mexico, and has worked with the Washington Peace Center and the Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns through the Lutheran Volunteer Corps. This article, written during the third week of strikes in Venezuela, is reprinted from the January/February issue of NewsNotes, published by the Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns.

A general strike that started on December 2 turned into the longest in Venezuelan history, threatening to completely destabilize the country. The opposition took measures to intensify and prolong the strike at every opportunity, creating a situation of extreme social tension which they clearly hoped would trigger either a coup or foreign intervention. As we write, the strike continues.

At first the strike had little effect, despite the media creation of what Maryknoll missioner Lisa Sullivan described as a "virtual' paro [strike], in which TV stations show over and over again the same uncrowded streets in the same wealthy sector of Caracas, while everywhere else things are up and running." She added that "people perceive (perhaps correctly) that the leader in this effort to oust Chavez is the media." Most media in Venezuela has long been used as a political instrument of the opposition, though the state-owned media is pro-government.

When it was clear that the general strike was dying, the opposition transformed it into a protest action, calling it an "active" strike. The opposition media leapt to blame all violence on Chavez personally, especially the tragic shooting deaths of three opposition protesters on December 7. The sharpshooter incident, which was strikingly reminiscent of the violence that served as a pretext for the April coup, caused the opposition to dig in their heels on the need for Chavez' departure.

During the strike, the state owned oil company PDVSA effectively halted oil exports, causing long lines at gas stations and threatening Venezuela's oil-dependent economy. PDVSA's involvement, which has been key to the strike's success, stems from the opposition-friendly management, who stand to gain from the company's privatization. They are angry that Chavez' new laws and constitution firmly place Venezuelan oil in the hands of the state. Strategically located, Venezuela supplies the US with 15% of its oil. Given the impending war with Iraq, the US cannot afford to lose access to this petroleum, but major US economic interests would also benefit from its privatization.

In the opinion of many Venezuelan friends of Maryknoll missioners in that country, the real issue in the conflict is Venezuela's oil. Keeping Venezuela's oil in public hands, which ensures that oil revenue goes towards the common good rather than into private pockets, is just part of Chavez' "radical" pro-poor social agenda that threatens the opposition's power. Other aspects include a land reform law, similar to the one passed in 1964, which Chavez clearly intends to enforce. The law has angered cattle ranchers near the Colombian border who currently benefit from weak land law enforcement, and land title mismanagement. Both the land law and a law strengthening state ownership of the oil industry go into effect January 1, 2003. The traditional parties of the elite also felt excluded by the government when they were only given a handful of delegation seats during the construction of Venezuela's 1999 constitution. Meanwhile, Venezuela's poor are fiercely loyal to the progressive document, carrying miniature copies with them and pointing out sections they helped write.

A familiar story is playing out in Venezuela, reminiscent of Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua: via a democratic process, a candidate with a radically pro-poor social agenda is elected (often by an overwhelming majority) only to have the social change process thwarted by extreme opposition, both from within and outside the country. One Maryknoll lay missioner observes, "Just like with [Chile's Salvador] Allende, the powerful absolutely refuse to let Chavez mover forward with his government."

With each phase of the strike, the opposition has radicalized its demands, framing the conflict as if it revolved completely around the president's personality: the call for a non-binding consultation on Chavez' rule transformed into a demand for a binding referendum; insistence on early elections gave way to cries for his resignation.

Any electoral "solution" at this point is unlikely to stem the chaos. The opposition's deep divisions create a leadership vacuum, and few would be able to take Chavez' place. Any electoral steps taken before August 2003, when the constitution permits a referendum on Chavez' rule, could be seen as unconstitutional. If Chavez is removed now, even through elections, the president's many supporters will see the move as illegal. Lisa Sullivan explains, "Whether or not one likes Chavez, it is not wise to underestimate the extraordinary passion that the barrio folks feel for him. They say that for the first time in their 40-year democracy there is a president who speaks their language, cares passionately for them, puts them as his top priority, and builds schools, low income housing, [and] sports complexes in their barrios. This was never the priority before... More than anything Chavez has opened the door to this large segment of society, and has invited them in. They don't take lightly the request to now step out."

For more information, read Charles Hardy's editorials on-line at <www.vheadline.com>

One month later, the public still waits hours to buy gasoline and cooks on wood fires due to the ongoing strike, though the government is slowly regaining its control over the oil industry. After seven weeks of hardship, the opposition is considering easing the strikes in some areas, fearing they are shooting themselves in the foot and eroding their base of support. The United States, Brazil, and other countries want to form a group of "friends of Venezuela" to encourage a negotiated solution to the conflict.

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