March 2002

Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC.

Pitfalls in Peacemaking: Guatemala and Sri Lanka

Avis Sri-Jayantha is a member of Chappaqua (NY) Friends Meeting and has followed events on Sri Lanka since before the war because of her husband, who was born there.

Certain of the current internal conflicts around the world cannot be won through military means alone and must be ended by negotiation between the warring sides. This process of compromise between militant parties over the nature of the state brings with it both new possibilities and new difficulties. Lessons learned from countries in which negotiations have successfully ended hostilities can be mined, however carefully, for those, such as Sri Lanka, in which the process of negotiation is just beginning.

In Guatemala, the government faced the URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca), a guerrilla group that fought on behalf of the indigenous Maya people, in a 36-year-long civil war which concluded in 1996. The Sri Lankan government has been fighting the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the guerrillas of the Tamil people, for 18 years and formal negotiations have not yet begun, although the Norwegians have been shuttling between the two sides for two years.

The successes obtained from the peace accords in Guatemala include:

• The formal recognition of indigenous rights
• The re-energizing of civil society
• An end to most violence
• The return of refugees
• The setting of goals for social spending and outcomes, such as literacy rates

These successes, however, do not completely eliminate the severe disappointment that many supporters of the indigenous feel over the outcome of the peace. The power structure in Guatemala remains in place and the space for indigenous political activity remains tenuous. The counterinsurgency state retains many of its defining characteristics with little to counterbalance its power. Civil society, supported by [originally in conjunction with]the international community, the URNG, and people's [originally a]desire for peace, managed to effect some change in Guatemala. Civil society alone is struggling to continue the process.

The most fundamental lesson to be learned by Sri Lankans from the Guatemalan case is that it is extremely hard to change the basic power structure of a country and, as a result, that any changes which are essential must be made directly at the time of the peace negotiations, rather than waiting for step-by-step changes or constitutional processes. Alternatively, a reliable, dedicated, external party must guarantee the implementation of all agreed-upon issues. Guatemala is a nominal democracy in which 60% of the population is indigenous, yet proposed changes to the constitution to implement the peace accords were voted down because of "the vast disparity between the makeup of the population and the makeup of the voting population..." (Susanne Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process, 2000) Similarly, Sri Lanka is a democracy in which Tamils form a minority and any changes to the unitary state would be voted down by those who want to retain their dominant role. The Guatemala accords prescribed that the army would be shrunk and its duties would be limited to external defense. The army has shed one third of its personnel, but retains domestic duties for 'crime-fighting' and 'drug interdiction.' In Sri Lanka, one of the LTTE's first requirements is that the government lift the blockade on civilian goods to LTTE-controlled areas to see if the politicians can indeed control the armed forces and are indeed interested in reintegrating the Tamil population.

Another lesson of the Guatemala case for Sri Lankans is how long such a negotiated peace effort takes. Initial discussions in Guatemala began in 1990 and a formal peace agreement was signed at the very end of 1996. There were long periods when the process seemed to have broken down. Either the end result was a lucky fluke which happened despite the lack of an overseeing 'godfather,' or, once important international and domestic players become convinced that negotiations, rather than war, are the only path to ending fighting, then the process gains a certain momentum which outlasts political and personnel changes.

Pressure for negotiations between the parties in Sri Lanka will not let up as long as the government cannot finance the war internally, the war puts such a drag on growth, there continues to be a significant flow of refugees to the outside world, and neither side is believed capable of winning militarily. A cosmetic process, engaged in only to lessen external pressures or to confine the fighting to Tamil areas, is, however, a distinct possibility.

Important actors inside Sri Lanka have as yet shown little commitment to ending the war through negotiations. Politicians talk about the need for peace, but even the mildest forms of devolution or equal opportunity bills cannot pass parliament and the Emergency Regulations, the backbone of the counterinsurgency state, have been routinely renewed every month for the past 25 years. There is no indication that anyone in the military is anything but enthusiastic about prosecuting the war. The top of the Buddhist hierarchy supports the war and is against any form of autonomy for Tamil areas. Sri Lanka's economy is not growing this year and the International Monetary Fund moans about the fiscal deficit, but the economy is far from the crisis conditions necessary to force significant change.

Recent Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka

The Sri Lankan government has been fighting to maintain the current unitary state. This unitary state is based on the view that the entire island was given to the Sinhalese language speakers, who constitute the majority of the population, to preserve their brand of Buddhism. Western-educated elites voice a desire for a plural, multicultural nation, but seem unable or unwilling to take the steps to implement such an evenhandedness in fact. In its early days President Kumaratunge's government proposed a mild form of devolution, strongly supported by the international community, that it was unable to implement. The Sri Lankan government believes that negotiations must begin with a political solution to the conflict. Some incentives for the government to enter negotiations are the economic consequences of high military spending, fear for the personal safety of key members of the government, and the government's inability to win the war decisively by military means. However, these factors have not been persuasive enough to make the Sri Lankan government willing to end the fighting unilaterally.

The LTTE is fighting for Tamil political, economic, and cultural rights, and its leaders have indicated some willingness to discuss the exact form for the protection and exercise of these rights. They believe that any negotiations must begin with alleviating the suffering of the Tamil people. Their military force has not been weakened as predicted a few years ago and support for their cause has grown substantially amongst Tamils both under and outside their control. This increase in support is a result of the LTTE's growing institutionalization, both as a competent, uncorrupted administration, and as a semi-regular military force capable of holding its own against the army. The LTTE's moral strength, in the eyes of many, comes from its unwavering focus on political rights for Tamils. All but one of the Tamil political parties in the South have recently acknowledged the LTTE as the main representative of the Tamils. The international community is more willing than in the recent past to acknowledge the LTTE as a player, but is still moving toward isolating it as an illegal entity. For the LTTE, pressure to end the war comes from the beggaring of the Tamil people, the large numbers of refugees, international isolation, and its inability to win the war decisively by military means. These factors have not been persuasive enough to make the LTTE willing to end the fighting unilaterally.

In December, 1999, President Kumaratunge announced that the Norwegians had agreed to help Sri Lanka work toward a solution to the ongoing war through negotiations. In the following few months, the LTTE had its largest military success of the war. It was only stopped from decimating a large part of the Sri Lankan army and capturing the Jaffna Peninsula by remonstrances from India (which is worried about its own centrifugal tendencies), an airlift of arms from Pakistan and Israel, and threats to the civilian population from the army, including the complete destruction of the second-largest town, Chavakkachcheri. The US State Department's Thomas Pickering visited Sri Lanka to announce that the LTTE would have an independent state "on the planet of the dead." However, the international community woke up to the fact that this war is not going to be won by the army.

Discussions commenced in a quiet way with the help of Eric Solheim, the designated Norwegian facilitator. In his annual Heroes' Day speech on November 27, 2000, Prabakaran, the LTTE's leader, emphasized his desire to end the war through negotiations. His only caveat was that these negotiations should take place in an 'atmosphere of good will.' The momentum of negotiations was encouraged by a Paris aid group, which hinted that aid could be dependent on progress toward peace and that Sri Lanka had a crisis of governance.

In December, 2000, the LTTE announced that it would observe a one month unilateral cease-fire in an effort to encourage moves toward peace. The Sri Lankan government refused to reciprocate, although the LTTE renewed the cease-fire for a total of four months. The cease-fire ended with a major assault by the army which the LTTE repulsed, inflicting heavy casualties. The length and strict observance of the cease-fire impressed the international community, particularly India, with the seriousness of the LTTE's desire for a negotiated settlement.

Solheim worked during the spring on a 'Memorandum of Understanding' which would lead to direct negotiations between the two sides. An understanding foundered, however, on the army's blockade of Tamil areas and the composition of international parties to observe any halt to hostilities. During this period, Britain considered anti-terrorism legislation and the Sri Lankan government lobbied hard to have the LTTE included in the proscription list. The LTTE evidently informed the government that, if it was included in the list--which it subsequently was--the LTTE would insist that the government de-proscribe the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The government found it difficult to step back from its assertion that the LTTE was a terrorist group, while the LTTE insisted that it could not negotiate as an illegal entity.

In June, 2001, Solheim was removed as facilitator at the behest of the Sri Lankan government. Later in the month, Kumaratunge's government entered a period of instability which led to elections on December 5, in which the opposition took control of parliament. A coalition of Tamil parties won 15 of the 18 seats in the Tamil areas on a platform of support for the LTTE and its positions.

Since the elections there has been significant movement towards de-escalation. The new prime minister and the LTTE asked the Norwegians to reactivate their facilitating role, and a team including the Norwegian deputy foreign minister is now shuttling between the two sides. A month-by-month cease-fire by each side has been in place since December 24, 2001, with no important violations. Negotiations for a mutual year-long cease-fire with Scandinavian and local monitors seems to be held up at the moment by disagreement over the free movement of unarmed fighters, an issue of disagreement in previous talks. Prime Minister Wickramasinghe has, significantly, begun to dismantle aspects of the counterinsurgency state, notably with some easing of the blockade of the north. The LTTE has freed some prisoners of war. There is talk of releasing some of the Tamils held for long periods under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and of lifting restrictions on fishing.

Whether the current opportunity will be used to end the war depends on the degree of international pressure (especially by India and donor countries), on the military balance, on the activities of anti-peace constituencies, on the local and international economic situation, and, finally, on the ingenuity and flexibility of the players involved.

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