Missile Defense: A False Sense of Security

Michelle Ciarrocca is Research Associate at the World Policy Institute, 65 Fifth Ave., Suite 413, New York, NY 10003; 212/229-5808 x112; <ciarrm01@newschool.edu>

The past year did not bode well for advocates of arms controls and disarmament. From the Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to the standstill in nuclear reductions with Russia, to President Clinton's pledge to increase military spending, our elected officials continue to favor a beefed-up military as a means for preserving our national security. And, with the US's ongoing pursuit of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, the future of arms controls looks even grimmer.

With President Clinton's June 2000 NMD deployment decision fast approaching, it's important to recap where missile defense has been, and where it could be going. Over the past year, President Reagan's vision of an impenetrable shield (a.k.a. Star Wars) that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" has undergone a political revival. Despite criticisms over the costs and technical difficulties associated with such a system that brought it to a halt in the early 1990s, the US is now committed to deploying a NMD system "as soon as technologically feasible." The new version of Star Wars has been restructured to focus on the seemingly more realistic goal of defending all 50 states from an accidental missile launch by Russia or China, or from the attack of a "rogue" nation such as Iran, Iraq, or North Korea.

The deployment of a missile defense system, once a litmus test for party affiliation, at present appears to have broad bipartisan support. Last March, in an overwhelming 97-3 vote, the Senate passed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which calls for deployment of an NMD system "as soon as technologically feasible." The House followed suit with a 345-71 vote in May with the President signing the bill into law last July. The President Clinton who began his term slashing missile defense spending, calling it "a costly system that could be obsolete tomorrow," stands in stark contrast to the Clinton who signed the NMD act and added $6.6 billion to the Pentagon's budget, bringing the total NMD spending to $10.5 billion over the next six years.

What sparked this new interest in missile defense is hard to say. Certainly a large part has been politically driven, with defense campaign contributions and the defense lobby playing a significant role. The top four defense contractors to benefit (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, TRW, and Raytheon) spent more than $34 million on lobbying and $4 million in campaign contributions in 1997/98 (stay tuned for the World Policy Institute's upcoming report, "Star Wars Resurgent: Inside the Missile Defense Lobby"). As well, the 1998 Congressionally mandated Rumsfeld Report that alleged the ballistic missile threat facing the US is "evolving more rapidly" than had been reported in the past, and President Clinton's and fellow Democrats' efforts to keep Republicans from using Rumsfeld as a 2000 election issue by boosting missile defense funding, have helped to gather momentum. Yet, a closer look reveals that neither of these arguments stands up to scrutiny. Missile defense is a dangerous, costly, and unworkable scheme designed to defend against a "rogue" nation that has yet to develop a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States.

President Clinton's NMD deployment decision will be based on four criteria: the overall costs of the program, its technological feasibility, an assessment of the ballistic missile threat facing the US, and the impact NMD would have on arms controls and reduction efforts.

Since 1983, the US has spent more than $70 billion on missile defense projects, with current funding at about $4 billion a year. The Brookings Institute has estimated that since the 1950s the various mutations of missile defense have consumed over $120 billion. And, most recently, the General Accounting Office estimated that the deployment of a single site NMD system would cost an additional $18 to $28 billion. Yet to date, beyond holding the status as the Pentagon's most expensive weapons program ever, the billions of dollars poured into research and development have produced precious little.

Technical feasibility

Using a combination of ground-based interceptors and radar and space-based sensors, NMD is supposed to intercept and destroy enemy warheads in space. Still pending an official review, the most recent intercept test held on January 18th was said to have failed to hit the target because of a problem with the infrared sensors. The first NMD intercept test, delayed by more than a year because of hardware concerns and technical problems, took place in October of 1999. Scoring a successful hit, missile defense advocates were quick to praise the test, yet recent reports reveal that the success is questionable. An intercept did occur, but as Tom Collina, of the Union of Concerned Scientists, aptly stated, "They got lucky." It seems that only after the interceptor veered off course following a decoy balloon did it then hone in on the smaller, dimmer warhead that was drifting close to the decoy. In defending against real world threats, an attacking nation is certain to employ hundreds or thousands of decoys. As missile defense analyst John Isaacs of the Council for a Livable World points out, "at high altitudes [missile defenses] can be easily overwhelmed by decoys and other countermeasures. Ultimately, these tests will have to demonstrate that a system can be operationally effective against realistic threats and against the full range of targets and countermeasures, not just scripted tests designed not to fail."

With one more test scheduled for April, President Clinton will be basing his deployment decision on a total of only three tests--one a questionable success, one an indisputable failure, and one that remains to be seen. It is clear that the "hit-to-kill" technology--the backbone of missile defense--remains far from ready with a test record of eight intercepts out of 22 attempts. By comparison, the Patriot missile, which has a far less demanding task, succeeded in 17 out of 17 tests before it was developed and deployed. Moreover, a panel of missile defense experts headed by former Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Larry Welch, released a report last November highly critical of the NMD program. Most notably, the report pointed out that the NMD program was beset by a "legacy of over-optimism" amongst government and defense officials and "instead of unusual clarity, there is unusual fragmentation and confusion about authority and responsibility." The panel also warned that a "high risk of failure remains" because of "compressed" testing schedules and lack of spare parts.

Aside from the technical hurdles NMD will have to clear, the perceived urgency for missile defense has been spurred on by an exaggerated assessment of the threat facing the US. When the Rumsfeld report came out saying the missile threat to the US was "evolving more rapidly" than had been previously reported, both media and government officials alike equated ability with intention. But the report made no policy recommendations and did not advocate deploying missile defense. Only Russia and China have ballistic missiles capable of reaching US soil, and while other nations will surely acquire this capability in the future, whether it be five, ten, or fifteen years from now, the likelihood of any US adversary's attacking the US with a ballistic missile is highly unlikely. The origins of a ballistic missile can not be concealed, making quick and massive retaliation on the part of the US enough deterrence for any would-be foe.

As John Pike from the Federation of American Scientists notes, "Every minute that the country is spending debating Star Wars, which isn't going to solve any security problems, is a minute we are not devoting much more practical responses to much more immediate problems."

The most troubling aspect of NMD is the damage that could be done to decades of arms control and reduction efforts. Deployment by the US would provoke potential adversaries into deploying more nuclear warheads in order to overpower any missile defense system the US puts in place.

Russia has made it very clear that future reductions in its nuclear arsenal via the START treaties--treaties that would reduce the number of deployed Russian strategic warheads about 75% from present levels--are conditional upon continued compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The ABM treaty limits each country to one national missile defense site with no more than 100 interceptors, thus ensuring that each country is susceptible to the dangers of the other's nuclear arsenal. Russia has also promised to deploy more of its Topol-M missiles if the US deploys a NMD system. The Topol-M missile is designed to overcome an anti-missile system by employing decoys and multiple warheads on each missile. Likewise China, with only a handful of ICBMs capable of reaching the US, fears its deterrent capability will be undermined and is prepared to deploy more long-range missiles in response. European allies have also voiced their opposition to US missile defense plans. Indeed, the proposed NMD system will do nothing more than provide a false sense of security for Americans and spur a new nuclear arms race globally.

The only truly effective means to safeguarding against nuclear weapons is by eliminating them altogether, but the US has placed arms control on the back burner. A change in US policy is desperately needed. The US should be supporting preventive measures like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further reductions of nuclear arsenals with Russia. While advocates for missile defense argue that treaties and arms controls aren't 100% verifiable, relying on a missile defense system would be a far greater gamble for US security. An increased reliance on diplomatic efforts and international organizations like the United Nations, coupled with further arms reductions and controls, would be a welcome alternative.