December 2001/
January 2002

Views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily of the AFSC.

US Military Base in Ecuador Shrouded in Corruption

Lawrence Reichard is coordinator of the AFSC Rural Economic Alternatives Program in Stockton, CA.

On October 21 I returned from a two-week American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) fact-finding trip to Ecuador and Colombia which examined Colombia's war, Ecuador's increasing involvement in that war, and US policy toward the northern Andean region.

In Ecuador I visited the coastal city of Manta, where the US is building a base to house 400 US military personnel. The personnel are supposed to limit their activities to anti-drug efforts, but even policymakers in Washington have conceded it's impossible to separate the drug war in Colombia from the Colombian military's war against that country's guerrillas.

The reaction of the Ecuadorans we met with in Manta to the presence of US military personnel in their land varied from alarm to approval, but even base supporters questioned the supposed underlying mission of the base.

Base supporters also admitted they knew nothing of how the presence of US military personnel in similar small, neutral countries adjacent to conflicts in Central America and Southeast Asia had pulled those countries into their neighbors' wars and yielded disastrous results. Faced with the very real possibility that the presence of US military personnel would invite cross-border attacks by Colombian guerrillas, base supporters held out nothing more than hope that this wouldn't happen. Such hope has done little so far to control the violence on the Colombia-Ecuador border that is already claiming an average of one life per day.

We met with Dr. Miguel Moran, a professor at the university in Manta, and coordinator of the Tohalli Movement, an organization opposed to the US base. Dr. Moran painted a vivid picture of a military base built on lies, misrepresentations and deceit.

The US base actually represents an expansion of an existing Ecuadoran air base. According to supporters of the base, no locals were displaced to make room for the original base. But according to Dr. Moran and peasant leaders with whom we met, as many as 2000 peasant families were uprooted, and none of them was compensated. The evidence we saw firsthand supported the assertion of base opponents, as the area surrounding the base is currently inhabited, indicating a likelihood of previous habitation in the area currently occupied by the base. A security perimeter around the base that is off limits to local fishermen is forcing the fishermen further out to sea in small boats that are ill-equipped for fishing in deeper waters, and locals told us several fishermen have been lost at sea as a result.

Under the terms of the base agreement, no more than 17 US personnel were to be stationed at the base prior to its official opening in mid-October of this year. But several sources told us the number of US personnel seen on Manta's streets suggested numbers considerably beyond the prescribed limit of 17. This bodes ill for adherence to the overall limit of 400 US personnel, and misrepresentation of numbers of US personnel on foreign soil is a serious problem that came to exemplify US deceit in Central America and Southeast Asia.

Supporters of the base continually evoked the base's benefits to the local economy. But according to Dr. Moran, 800 jobs were promised for the base's construction, and only 200 jobs materialized. Our observation of the worksite supported a figure far closer to 200 than 800. Dr. Moran also said that locals were told they would receive US-scale wages but instead were being paid the local minimum wage of $120 per month, a far cry from a livable wage.

Everyone with whom we met, base supporters and opponents alike, spoke in terms of the eventual creation of a comprehensive base that would take in the expanded air base, and nearby port and Ecuadoran navy facilities. Plans are already underway to construct a road that would directly link the three facilities. But there's a problem. Thousands of people live inside the triangle formed by the three facilities, and should the idea of a comprehensive base materialize, as is likely, then these people are going to have to go. If history repeats itself, they will be forcibly removed without compensation.

Many Ecuadorans are convinced the US intends to establish a permanent, colonial presence in Manta to take the place of what the US gave up in Panama. It is feared that like Panama before it, Manta will be used to train anti-democratic elements of Latin America's armies, and as a staging ground for US intervention in the region.

These are precisely the kinds of operations that gave rise to deadly riots during the US occupation of the Panama Canal Zone, and could lead to a resurrection of guerrilla activity in Ecuador.

Only time will tell whether these fears will become reality. But some things are already clear. The Bush administration and its supporters in Congress are being disingenuous in asserting that the administration's Andean Initiative has nothing to do with fighting Colombia's guerrillas. The United States is getting more and more involved in Colombia's war. And last but certainly not least for the largely impoverished people of Ecuador who have a long, almost uninterrupted tradition of peace and neutrality, US foreign policy is pushing their small country into a potentially devastating war from which there may be no easy exit.

Michelle Ciarrocca is a Research Associate at the World Policy Institute at the New School in New York. Erin Peck is an intern at the World Policy Institute and a student at Bard College.

As Congress works on next year's foreign aid bill, dominating the agenda will be the new war on terrorism. However, a large portion of the bill will fund the "old" war on drugs. Included in the bill is the Bush administration's Andean Initiative, a follow-up to President Clinton's $1.3 billion Plan Colombia, which focuses on reducing the amount of illicit drugs grown in Colombia. The initiative provides military and economic assistance to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Unlike Plan Colombia, this year's bill offers a refreshing break from the past by placing greater emphasis on human rights accountability, and on economic alternatives to coca production.

Children from a child support program south of Bogota. Many displaced families have settled in shantytowns with no running water, no phones, dangerous hijacked electricity, and rampant poverty and unemployment. Photo: Lawrence Reichard

For almost two decades, US policy in Colombia has focused on dishing out large sums of money for the arming and training of the Colombian police and armed forces, and the fumigation of coca fields. Yet, despite this militarized approach to fighting the drug war, drugs are more readily available than ever before. A report from the White House in January showed that coca cultivation in Colombia increased 140 percent during the period 1995-99. In 2000 alone, under Plan Colombia 123,000 acres of coca plants were sprayed, yet cultivation of coca increased 11 percent.

Colombia now ranks as the third largest recipient of US aid after Israel and Egypt. However, the aid does little to address Colombia's most pressing problem: an ongoing 40-year civil war, which has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions. The parties to the conflict include the Colombian Armed Forces, the country's two main guerrilla groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and right-wing paramilitary organizations including the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)--all of which groups have committed numerous human rights abuses.

The US has made repeated claims of supporting the peace process in Colombia, but the influx in military aid has only strengthened the ties between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups, thereby embroiling the US in Colombia's guerrilla war and adding to regional instability.

Lawrence Reichard visited Colombia with an AFSC fact-finding mission.

In Mocoa we were given an outline of how Plan Colombia's "pactos sociales" (social pacts--the coca crop substitution program) work on the ground. Campesinos who grow coca are given a credit of two million pesos (about US $1000) toward agricultural supplies in exchange for their agreement to give up coca production. (Ironically, we were told later that upon hearing of this financial incentive, the first thing many non-coca producing campesinos did was run out and plant coca in order to qualify for the program.)

But the much-vaunted credit can only be used to purchase seeds and animals from the NGOs that manage the program. Furthermore the NGOs take 30% of the credit right off the top for "administrative costs." But beyond that, the supplies provided by the NGOs--when they are delivered at all--are markedly substandard and often entirely inappropriate for local soil and climatic conditions.

The most vivid example of substandard materials are the hens the program provides. According to a campesino leader in Puerto Asis, the hens are old, tired, and decrepit birds released from service by Colombia's largest poultry operations. What is more, the hens have no beaks. They were removed because in their former megafarm homes the hens ate only processed feed and thus didn't need beaks, and would only use them to peck each other, sometimes to death, in overcrowded cages. The hens come with a bag of processed feed, but when that bag runs out the hens are unable to eat the food scraps Putumayo's peasants traditionally feed their hens. Being for the most part highland birds, the hens are also unaccustomed to the rigors of Putumayo's hot, humid climate. As a result of all this, the hens suffer a high mortality rate in their new homes. One campesino in Puerto Asis told us that in 9 months, 37 of his 40 hens had died.

With the social pact, Putumayo's campesinos again find themselves "between the back and the wall." They are under pressure from the military and paramilitaries to participate in the program, but according to the campesino leader in Puerto Asis with whom we met, the FARC has threatened to kill anyone who participates. The FARC knows who is participating by the animals and feed they have.

"So," I asked the campesino, "you risked your life for three hens?" "Yes, he said wryly, "that's right."

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