Shifting Security Paradigms in East Asia

Karin Lee, for three years representative for the AFSC's East Asia Quaker International Affairs Program, is currently researching ways to work on US East Asia Foreign Policy.

Nothing illustrates the post 9-11 altered security relationships in East Asia better than China's overnight transformation from the US military's tacit excuse for missile defense to a key ally in the "war against terrorism." The tragic events of September 11 have brought additional changes in East Asia, such as justification for extending the role of the Self Defense Forces in Japan. For forces eager to sustain the momentum of US militarism, it is a time of nearly unlimited support to pursue a militaristic agenda.

But at the same time, the Sept. 11 attacks have led the US to court rather than disdain multilateral efforts. The US quickly moved to release frozen back-dues to the UN. As the US begins to negotiate on new ground--a superpower under attack from non-state actors--old enemies are quickly becoming tentative allies.

The Bush Administration in East Asia: The First Months

In order to understand the nature of these changes, it is helpful to summarize the Bush administration's initial approach to East Asia. As Bush entered office, two key components of Clinton's East Asia policy came under close scrutiny: the manner of engagement with North Korea and the re-casting of policy toward China. These studies took place parallel to an overall review of military strategy, Andrew Marshall's confidential "Defense Strategy Review," and complemented the administration's key military objective: to further missile defense research.

East Asia

The review of North Korea policy brought US-North Korean dialogue to an abrupt halt. At the end of June, the policy review was complete and the Bush Administration was ready to re-open talks. But by then, North Korea was less enthusiastic: in the interim, the North had found more interested partners, both old (China and Russia) and new (the European Union). In early September, the content and timing of the next US-North Korea talks were still under negotiation.

Changing US Policy toward China Under the Clinton administration, North Korea and other "rogue states" were the stated excuse for the missile defense system, and US policy proscribed identifying China as a genuine military threat. But over the course of its first several months, the Bush administration voiced its suspicions of China. Bush, in his hard-line posture when a US spy plane was forced to land on China's Hainan Island, demonstrated his perception of China as untrustworthy. And in April, breaking a long-standing taboo of silence on the One China question, Bush pledged to do "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan, and approved the biggest-ever arms sale package to Taiwan.

Casting China as an uncompromising enemy is not an easy task for several reasons. Many forces within the US influence US China policy: pro-business lobbies that urge China's entry into the WTO, human rights advocates, and military strategists, to name a few.

In June, according to US News and World Report, the National Intelligence Council fired the RAND think tank from its classified assignment evaluating the military threat posed by China. RAND was apparently headed toward concluding that China, while a growing military power, is no real threat for the US in the near future. In June, James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, walked the fine line, saying "We do not view China as the enemy. We view China as a partner on some issues and a competitor for influence in the region."

Both aspects of the Bush Administration's China policy have been in evidence. While the Administration has supported China's entry into the WTO (which took place mid-September, and will be effective in December) it has been unwilling to forgo missile defense development, despite China's vehement opposition. Ultimately Marshall's review concluded that China's slow but steady military build-up puts US bases in Asia at increasing risk and recommends that the US look for a way to protect its interests in the region from a safer distance and to strengthen ties with partners in Asia.

At the same time, China has been resisting extension of US dominance in East Asia. China is a key player in reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. It has lobbied hard within the UN to counter US-led criticism of its human rights record. And it is a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (formerly the Shanghai Five)--China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan--which was formed as a confidence-building measure, to counter US military dominance in the Asia Pacific, and to confront separatist movements.

Japan's nationalist Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi welcomes a re-emphasis of the importance of Japan's quasi-military role. Koizumi entered office with the hope of passing a Diet resolution granting the right to enter collective (i.e., multilateral) self-defense efforts. Such participation is banned by the Japanese Constitution's Article 9, which prevents Japan from using force to solve international conflicts.

After September 11th

The US has found willing East Asian partners in its "War Against Terrorism." South Korea has committed to providing about 450 non-combat troops. Japan's Koizumi has introduced legislation which, circumventing the constitution, temporarily allows the Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) to assist the US in a non-military role, such as using SDF boats to transport US armaments. Japan is also preparing for the humanitarian dispatch of SDF airplanes to transport relief supplies early next month to refugees expected from Afghanistan, and hopes to play a diplomatic role in the region.

North Korea has offered limited support for retaliation, while warning against civilian casualties and the risk of global war. More significantly, it has strongly condemned the South for supporting the US. According to South Korean news agencies, a private message to the US government was worded more strongly in support of the US. The US had at one time indicated that it might ask the DPRK to provide intelligence, but that possibility most likely evaporated when the US kept North Korea on the October revision of its list of Terrorist Nations.

Perhaps most significantly, China has gone from being "not an enemy" to being an ally. While China has called for the US to obey international law, and to work within the framework of the UN, it has also given its support to US military retaliation. It has pledged to cut off financing for terrorist organizations, and to share intelligence about terrorist groups and activities. China may even provide support for operations against terrorist targets.

Yet such cooperation is sure to come at a cost. The Chinese foreign ministry said that the United States should give its "support and understanding in [China's] fight against terrorists and separatists"--a reference to Tibet and Muslim Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous region. (In mid-October Chinese authorities arrested 180 people who protested the destruction of a mosque in Xinjiang, claiming that separatists in the region have links to international terrorist networks.) Also, the US still has sanctions on China for transferring missile technology to Pakistan, even though the US recently lifted proliferation-related sanctions on Pakistan itself.

Government Center, Boston, 10/8 © Pat Rabby

There is debate in the region about how far support of the US should go. While leaders in the US call the Sept. 11th attacks a "cowardly attack on freedom" with no clear basis, not everybody in East Asia agrees. Anti-US rhetoric in PRC chat-rooms immediately after the attack has been censored, but even academics do not see the US as blameless. "Chinese analyses almost all point to post-Cold War US foreign policy as one of the direct causes," according to Jing-dong Yuan from the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Such analysis may lead the PRC, in the long run, to pull back from aligning itself too closely with US policy. Furthermore, China is wary about the possibility of permanent US bases in central Asia.

Even among the closest US allies, the depth of support is questionable. In Japan, critics warn against giving too large a role to the SDF. An early October Asahi Shimbun poll showed that nearly half disagree with the legislation allowing the SDF to provide support for the US military. Twenty percent of South Korean academics think that US foreign policy is responsible for the attack, and labor unions there are demonstrating against South Korean involvement.

A Genuine Multilateral Approach

Many voices around the world, while grieving for the horrible loss of life at the WTC, have also been condemning the bombing of Afghanistan and the loss of life there. Many people insist that the UN, rather than the US, must conduct the global fight against terrorism. Apprehended terrorists must be tried in an international tribunal. Secretary of State Colin Powell has taken a leading role in transforming an initial cry for a unilateral war into an attempt to win allies. In East Asia that may mean cooperation among states that have formerly been adversaries, but it may also mean increasing militarization and enmity for other states.

During this time of great shifts in world politics that include the shifting alliances and agendas in East Asia, it is more important than ever that a New World Order be shaped by multilateral hands.

Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula

The Bush Administration's early review of US-North Korean policy not only stalled US-North Korea reconciliation, it also deeply undermined South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" of engagement. In seeming retaliation for Bush's publicly announced suspicions of Kim Jong Il last March, North Korean tabled rapprochement with the South, including family reunions and construction of a railroad linking North with South.

Public disappointment has contributed to South Korean disapproval of both the Sunshine Policy and the Kim Dae Jung administration, masking the simple and extraordinary achievements of engagement. But statistics contradict the criticism that the South is making all the concessions, with the North giving nothing in return. For example, President Kim Dae Jung is denounced for giving too much aid to the North. Yet the amount of aid peaked at U#232,000,000 in 1995, under previous president Kim Young Sam. The highest figure under Kim Dae Jung was only US$ 7,863,000, in 2000.

Face-to-face contact is the most significant outcome of the Sunshine Policy. Compare the number of people particpating in the engagement process: in 1989, one person from South Korea visited North Korea; in 1998 the figure rose to 3,317, and in 2000, over 7,300 South Koreans visited the North. The growth in visits from the North to the South is as astounding: from no visits in 1989 and 1998 to 706 North Koreans visiting the South in 2000. These figures demonstrate not only the number of meetings taking place, but also that people on both sides of the DMZ are learning how to communicate, negotiate, and resolve disagreements with one another.

Such experience will continue to support and nurture the reconciliation process beyond concrete achievements, such as family reunion visits and railroad construction. Indeed such understanding, gained through the experience of cooperation, might have prompted the North's announcement that it would resume talks with the South in September.

Unfortunately, the North's announcement came too late and South Korean Unification Minister Lim Dong Won was forced to resign along with other members of Kim Dae Jung's cabinet. The Sunshine Policy was dealt another blow when, in mid-October, the North cancelled at the last minute the fourth round of family reunions. The North claims the South's heightened security measures in response to the US bombing of Afghanistan made them feel unsafe in Seoul. The South then turned down the North's offer to meet at the Mount Kumkang resort complex.

Is the Sunshine Policy finished? I think not. The opposition party in South Korea, which has strongly criticized the Sunshine Policy, declared in late September that it would not oppose the donation of the nation's surplus rice to North Korea, and that it was even arranging a long-term loan of rice of its own. This could be a sign that the policy of engagement will transcend party politics and become part of government policy, regardless of which party is in power and beyond the cycle of successes and disappointments.

[Source for figures: Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean Reunification 2001: Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea]

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