Pakistan: The American Connection

The visit of an American president to Pakistan has always been a major event for our ruling establishment. Since the early fifties, when we decided to join US-sponsored defense pacts, the American connection has been a key element of our foreign policy. Through good times and bad, we have clung to it tenaciously even when Americans wanted to distance themselves.

Our persistence has sometimes paid off when events have forced the Americans to rely on us. It happened when the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. It happened again when the Taliban and Al Qaeda became targets of American wrath.
Given the importance we attach to this relationship, it should have surprised no one that we changed our Afghan policy, flawed as it was, after one phone call from the US Secretary of State. Zia after the Soviet invasion was equally forthcoming, although he haggled more about the price. (Remember the 'peanuts' jibe he flung at Carter after a few billion dollars were offered for our support?)

Musharraf did not argue about the price and has not received nearly as much direct assistance as Zia did, but there have been other advantages. We got a major rescheduling on our commercial debt from the Paris Club and some relief in bilateral debt. We also got strong support from American-influenced international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. More importantly, for Musharraf personally, acceptance came from the international community due to American sponsorship.

The US connection has been critical in giving this government a legitimacy of sorts. Zia was a pariah internationally because not only was he a military dictator but he had hanged an elected prime minister. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came to his rescue and, thanks to the US, made him acceptable worldwide.

Musharraf has been less overtly dictatorial but no amount of surface freedom of the press or the façade of a parliamentary democracy can hide the fact that he is ruling by force.

The American connection is critical for Musharraf because this is his passport to international legitimacy and domestic pre-eminence. It is instructive to compare Musharraf's travels before and after he became America's partner in the "war against terror." He has been hosted by every powerful country and lauded by every western leader without exception. Before 9/11 the only people ready to lay out the red carpet for him were the Burmese junta.

Are the Americans getting enough in return? They are in the short term. Though they are not entirely happy with Musharraf regarding the rooting out of Al Qaeda and the Taliban from the tribal areas, they don't see a better alternative.

For a long time the American establishment has found it convenient to deal with strongarm leaders. They can take decisions quickly and do not have to go through a parliamentary overview or have any worry about the electorate. All this rhetoric about democracy by Bush is exactly that: rhetoric.

Any lingering fascination with democracy has been washed away by the Hamas victory in Palestine, by radical Shiite success in Iraq, and by the Islamic Brotherhood's gains in Egypt. Military dictators who can toe the American line are about to come into fashion again.

This may be good news for dictators, but at least in the Pakistani context not a great lesson for the Americans to learn. The political forces that have public support in this country are liberal and for want of a better word, secular.

If the Americans continue to support Musharraf in Pakistan they undermine democracy and thus weaken the very liberal and secular forces they are keen should rise to power in the Islamic world. Actually, by not supporting genuine democracy in Pakistan, they are creating conditions for obscurantist and radical forces to gain strength in the country. If genuine democracy is not restored in Pakistan, it is the mullahs who stand to gain and the liberal and secular forces that lose out.

This equation can only be changed if the Americans understand the impact of their actions and do something about it.

I am no one to advise a mighty superpower, but the US would serve its own interests better by trying to establish a relationship with genuine political forces.

They represent the people. Establishing a genuine linkage with them creates a stronger bond with a country and its people than putting all of one's eggs in one man's basket.